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THE INTEGRATION OF HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS
PHILIP MECHEM*

The subject of the integration of wills, including so-called "incorporation by reference" has received its classic treatment in Dean
Evans' well-known paper.' He deals for the most part, however,
with attested wills; it is proposed here to discuss certain special as2
pects of the problem arising when the Will is holographic.
Integration, according to Dean Evans, raises the question "which
of given papers offered for probate are to be regarded as constituting
the will." 3 Since it is often necessary to discriminate between different
paragraphs, sentences, words, and even letters or figures on a given
paper, the question, with reference to holographic wills, may be rephrased: what writings constitute the will?
Practically speaking, the question comes up most commonly in
4
one or more of three somewhat distinct forms: (a) Is some writing
not in testator's hand a part of the will so as to invalidate it in toto?
(b) Is some writing "covered" or validated by the signature or date
which appears superficially to be appended to some other writing?
(c) May a holographic will incorporate by reference some writing not
in testator's hand? Or, to express the same ideas more compactly:
(a) What must be included?
* Professor of Law, State University of Iowa.

'Evans, Incorporation by Reference, Integration, and Non-Testamentary
Act (1925) 25 Cor. L. REv. 879.
'Confusion is caused by the two meanings of "holographic.'
WEBsTEm,
NEW INTm ArIoNAL DIcTIoNARY (1932) defines holograph as "A document
...
wholly in the handwriting of the person.., whose act it purports to be."
In this literal sense a will in any jurisdiction may be holographic in fact; its
holographic character is of no legal significance save possibly from an evidentiary standpoint. See Matter of Turell, 166 N. Y. 330, 59 N. E. 910 (1901).
In nineteen states, however, the statutes sanction a special type of will, often
referred to in the statute itself as a holographic or olographic will, which
needs no attesting witnesses and derives its validity from the fact that it is
wholly in the handwriting of the testator. The statutes usually provide that
such a will be signed, often that it be dated, and, in two states that it be found
after testator's death among his valuable papers or have been lodged in the
hands of another for safe-keeping. For a compilation and analysis of these
statutes see Bordwell, Statute Law of Wills (1928-9) 14 IowA L. ,zv. 1, 172,
283, 428, at 25. It is with the second sort of holographic wills (i.e., those
given a special sanction by statute) that this article deals.
3 Op. cit. supra note 1, at 879.
' By "writing" it is meant here to include printing, typewriting, stamping
or any other method of making marks on paper; the writer is not aware of
any word that covers them all. As a matter of fact it is most commonly printing that is the form of "writing" causing the difficulty.

214

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

(b) What nay be included?
(c) What may be incorporated?
A California case, Estate of Francis,6 will serve as a concrete
instance. The will offered for probate consisted of a paper and
the envelope in which it had been found. The paper contained testamentary provisions, was signed and dated, and was wholly in testator's handwriting except that in the date two numerals (here italicized) were printed, thus: "1919". The envelope was dated in testator's handwriting. Clearly, effect cannot be given to the printed numerals. Can they be disregarded? This is question (a). If they
cannot, i.e., if it must be held that they are a part of the will, then
the whole will fails; it is not entirely in the hand of the testator. If
they can be ignored, there are two alternatives. The date on the
paper, minus the printed numerals, might be used, thus: "October 22,
19." Or entire reliance might be placed on the holographic date on
the envelope. This raises question (b): do the envelope and the
paper together comprise the will? If so, it is dated; it is not, if the
paper alone be regarded as the will.
Question (c) was probably not raised by the case. If, however,
the will had been regarded as valid, 7 and if it had given the residue
equally "to the persons named in a typewritten list I have made and
left with this will," question (c) would clearly have been raised.
It is proposed to consider briefly the authorities on each of these
questions.
(A) What must be included?
Reflection, and the cases, show two different theories. One may
be called the intent theory: foreign matter becomes (fatally) a part
of the will when ever it appears that testator intended to make it, or
regard it as, part of his will. The second, which may be called the
surplusage theory, will, if necessary, ignore anything that may be
left out without affecting the sense or completeness of the document.
To use the Franciscase again as an example: the intent theory would
hold the printed numerals a part of the will because testator so obviously meant them to be such; the surplusage theory might disregard
'This form of statement is adopted here as being non-controversial, altho
it is suggested (infra) in section (c)that the whole idea of incorporation by
reference may be inapplicable to holographic wills.
'191 Cal. 600, 217 Pac. 746 (1923).
'The court held that the printed numerals, while superfluous, had been
made a part of the will by testator and so rendered it one not wholly in
testator's handwriting. The opinion is brief and relies wholly on Estate of
Thorn, 183 Cal. 512, 192 Pac. 19 (1920), discussed infra.
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them, ignoring testator's frame of mind, and having regard only to
the fact that "19" is, under the circumstances, an adequate abbreviation of "1919."
At first blush it would seem that the former of these theories was
the most, perhaps the only, logical one. If testator starts out to make
a will, writes a few paragraphs on the typewriter and then a few by
hand, neither logic nor policy suggests calling the last few paragraphs
"his will"; they are obviously part of his will. This must be equally
true if typewritten sentences or words rather than typewritten paragraphs are involved. Analogies, nevertheless, for a different view are
not wholly lacking.8 And experience shows that however logical
the intent theory may be, it has in practice two serious disadvantages.
First, it leads to the rejection of wills for what must seem very
trifling reasons. Second, its operation depends upon a finding as to
an intent which is often obscure and in some instances probably nonexistent.
California has been the chief exponent of the intent theory; its
experience illustrates these disadvantages. Estate of Thorn9 is
probably the leading case.' 0 Testator devised "my country place
Cragthorn consisting of . . .", the italicized word being inserted by a
rubber stamp. The court admitted that the property was adequately
described without the stamped word but rejected the will, saying:
"We know of no rational theory upon which it can be held that words
8
The most striking analogy is to be found in a situation sometimes arising
under statutes requiring wills to be signed at the end. Where some "unessential" provision follows the signature there is authority that it may be ignored

and the part preceding the signature be treated as "the will" thus making
it signed at the end.

(1905).

See, e.g., Ward v. Putnam, 119 Ky. 889, 85 S. W. 178

The English practice seems to be to admit what precedes the signa-

ture, irrespective of the materiality of what follows it. See Millward v.
Buswell, 20 T. L. R. 714 (1904). A slight analogy may be found in the prac-

tice of omitting from probate portions of the will induced by fraud, or, under

the English doctrine, by mistake. Again, under some circumstances, part of a
lost will may .be admitted to probate where it is impossible to prove it all.

'Supra note 7.
"Apparently the first California case on the point, though one not so often
cited as the Thorn case, is Estate of Rand, 61 Cal. 468 (1882). The will was
written in a printed form. Disregarding the printed words, those written by
testator would have constituted a complete expression of testator's intent, save
for the naming of an executor. The court, however, said: "It was strenuously
urged before us that the portions of the paper which were written by deceased
should be admitted to probate, omitting the printed portions. We are not at
liberty to so hold. We should thereby, in effect, change the statute, and make
it read that such portions of an instrument as are in the handwriting of the
deceased constitute an olographic will. The instrument, in its entirety, is
before us. It was not entirely written by the hand of the deceased." Cf.
Estate of Soher, 78 Cal. 477, 21 Pac. 8 (1889).
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deemed by the testator himself essential to a description of the property devised, and inserted by him or under his direction as a part of
such description in the dispositive clause of the will devising the property, do not constitute part and parcel of the will itself, notwithstanding that evidence might show the property to be sufficiently identified
without the presence of such words.""
The rule of the Tlwrn case was reiterated in several later decisions' 2 but in Estate of Oldham,'8 the court was moved to take a
slightly more liberal position. Testator used paper with a printed
letter-head; he wrote the date immediately after the printed words
"Los Angeles, California" and "approximately on the same line."
Here the intent theory posits an unanswerable question: did testator
regard the printed words "Los Angeles" as part of his will? Could
he have answered the question himself ? The court, sustaining the
will, said that the location of the date was too slight a fact to "warrant
the conclusion" that testator meant to make the printed words part
of his will. This seems to mean that where there is any doubt as to
intent, it will be resolved in favor of the will. The Oldham case was
followed in Estate of DeCaccia1 4 on very similar facts; in Estate of
Whitney' 5 the court went so far as to say that the Thorn and other
earlier cases were "distinguished, if not in effect overruled" by the
Oldham and DeCaccia cases.
Two Utah decisions' 8 applying the intent theory show a similar
history. Experience shows it to be one apt to work harshly, difficult
of application, and prolific of litigation ;17 it is significant to note the
"The court expressly refused to follow a leading case adopting the "surplusage" theory, McMichael v. Bankston, 24 La. Ann. 451 (1872), discussed
infra.
"Estate of Francis, supra note 6; Estate of Bernard, 197 Cal. 36, 239
Pac. 404 (1925).
"203 Cal. 618, 265 Pac. 183 (1928).
"205 Cal. 719, 273 Pac. 552 (1928).
"103 Cal. App. 577, 284 Pac. 1067 (1930).
Estate of Wolcott, 54 Utah 165, 180 Pac. 169 (1919) ; Estate of Yowell,
75 Utah 312, 285 Pac. 285 (1930). The first of these cases contains a very
careful analysis of the problem and a quite explicit repudiation of the surplusage theory. The later case (on its facts one of the most extraordinary and
picturesque to be found) illustrates the difficulty of applying the intent theory;
very persuasive is the dissenting opinion of STRAup, J., to the effect that the
court is in fact doing just what it repudiated in the Wolcott case, i.e., admitting
to probate a will "which was not the document as prepared by the deceased as
his will, but was one which was sheared and trimmed by the court so as to
make what was thought to be a valid will for him."
"A striking parallel is afforded by the cases dealing with the problem
whether testator's name, written at some other than the usual place, was intended as and can be regarded as, his signature. The California decisions on
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tendency to modify it in the state which originally applied it most
rigorously. 18
Of the cases adopting the surplusage theory (more often implicitly than explicitly) the most-cited has been McMichael v. Bankston.19
The facts are meagerly reported; it is said that the word "acres" in
one line and the word "to" in another were not written by testator;
also, that other provisions of the will make the meaning amply clear
without regard to these foreign words. The court says: "It is very
manifest that the presence or absence of the two words can have no
material effect upon the meaning or contents of the will... We may
safely, under the first clause of article 1589, R. C. C.20 Consider
them as not written and not impair the validity or effect of the will.
We cannot say that the law requires the will to be annulled for so
unimportant and trifling a cause."
On any view the words would be immaterial unless adopted by
testator; the decision then is only explicable on the ground that testator did intend to adopt the words and that the court nevertheless
held they could be disregarded as surplusage. Subsequent Louisiana
decisions appear to justify this interpretation. Thus in Jones v.
the point show very much the same history: a very strict early decision resulting
in -a rule harsh, difficult to apply and prolific of litigation which eventually is

distinguished practically to the point of extinction. Cf. Estate of Manchester,
174 Cal. 417, 163 Pac. 358 (1917) with Estate of Bauman, 114 Cal. App. 551,
300 Pac. 62 (1931). For detailed discussion of these cases, see Mechem, The
Rule in Leinayne v. Stanley (1931) 29 MicH. L. REv. 685 (the California cases
are treated at pp. 697-699.)
" In the new California Probate Code, which took effect in August, 1931,
the following was added (§53) to the statute authorizing holographic wills:
"No address, date or other matter written, printed or stamped upon the document, which is not incorporated in the provisions which are in the handwriting
of the decedent, shall be considered as any part of the will." The note of the
Code Commissioners indicates that this is regarded as a codification of the

rule in In re DeCaccia's Estate, supra note 14; quaere, whether it adds anything to the existing statute. See Evans, Comments on the Probate Code of
California (1931), 19 CALw. L. Rv. 602. Professor Evans, the draftsman of
the Code, in discussing various changes in the law that were suggested but not
made, says (at 609) : "The effect of a holographic will is destroyed if any

word is incorporated which is not in the handwriting of the testator. Why
should not the statute be liberalized so as to ignore any word or phrase not in
the handwriting of the decedent which makes no difference in the meaning of

the will, that is, if the will must be given the same interpretation and effect
whether the printed or stamped words are in the will or not? . . ."
Such liberalization of the statute would prevent any future will being denied probate upon
such an aimless technicality as upset the Thorn will."

SSupra
note 11.
' Viz., "Erasures not approved by the testator are considered as not made;

and words added by the hand of another, as not written."

tation suggested, this provision was really irrelevant.

On the interpre-
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Kyle 2 ' the will as apparently originally written bore a date in which
the numerals 191 were printed; five years later testator had added
another date in his own hand and had had the will witnessed. It was
admitted to probate, the court saying: "It is clear that all which is
not in the handwriting of testator must be disregarded. R. C. C.
1588, 1589. McMichael v. Bankston.... Nor does the fact that there
are subscribing witnesses to the olographic will affect in any way its
2
validity. That is mere surplusage and to be disregarded."
The most extreme instance of the application of the theory is
doubtless a Virginia case where testator made a will by writing in
the blanks of a printed form ;23 the most explicit statement of it has
been made by the Supreme Court of North Carolina: "Where all the
words appearing on a paper in the handwriting of the deceased person
are sufficient, as in the instant case, to constitute a last will and testament, the mere fact that other words appear thereon, not in such handwriting, but not essential to the meaning of the words in such handwriting, cannot be held to defeat the intention of the deceased, otherwise clearly expressed, that such paper-writing is and shall be his
last will and testament. '2 4 Cases from several other states more
25
or less clearly adopt the same view.
The disadvantages of the intent theory are a matter of actual experience; those of the surplusage theory may be said to be as yet
latent. In none of the cases operating under the latter view does
there seem to have been a gross violence done to the statute. Such a
1,168 La. 728, 123 So. 306 (1929).
'Cf. Succ. of Walsh, 166 La. 695, 117 So. 777 (1928) (the court quoted
with approval DuRANTON, COURs DE DRor FRANCAIS (at 27) as follows:
"The testament must be written entirely by the hand of the testator; so that a
single word in a foreign hand would vitiate the whole, even though that word
were superfluous for it would be true to say that the testament has not been
written entirely in the hand of the testator, as the law requires; that word
therefore, would vitiate not only the clause or the disposition in which it
occurred, but the act in its entirety.")
I Gooch v. Gooch, 134 Va. 21, 113 S. E. 873 (1922). In support of the
decision it may -be pointed out that the holograph was brief and, in a sense
complete. It did not, that is, incorporate any of the printed matter. It may
be doubfful however, whether testamentary intent would have appeared sufficiently but for the printed exordium.
'In Will of Lowrance, 199 N. C. 782, 155 S.E. 876 (1930). The will began: "Will of Mrs. S. A. Lowrance made 2 March, 1928 West Center Avenue,"
the italicized words being part of the printed letterhead. The court pointed
out that the statute did not require dating and said further: "The words in
print appearing on the sheets of paper propounded in the instant case are surplusage."
See, e.g., Sneed v. Reynolds, 166 Ark. 581, 266 S. W. 686 (1924) ; Baker
v. Brown, 83 Miss. 793, 36 So. 539 (1904) ; In re Noyes' Estate, 40 Mont. 190,
105 Pac. 1017 (1909).
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case can readily be imagined; it is a short step from ignoring an awkward printed date to accepting as holographic a will which is "substantially" all in the handwriting of the testator, and so on. Whether
such a step will be taken is a matter as yet purely speculative.
A digest of the cases on this point, grouped on the basis of typical
26
fact situations, is appended in the note.
(B) What may be included?
Disregarding any legal requirements, and speaking in a purely
lay or factual sense, we should probably say something like this: the
will is the sum total of testamentary writings intended by the testator
together to constitute his will. The law, however, sets limitations of
two sorts. First, the will and its parts must satisfy certain formal
requirements. 27 Second, the fact that the documents offered are
"Attestation: The cases are unanimous that an otherwise valid holographic
will is not invalidated by the fact that testator has it witnessed. Estate of
Sober, *ipra note 10; Harl v. Vairin, 175 Ky. 468, 194 S. W. 546 (1917);
Andrews v. Andrews, 12 Mart. N. S. 713 (La. 1823); Suce. of Roth, 31 La.
Ann. 315 (1879) ; Jones v. Kyle, supra note 21; Harrison v. Burgess, 8 N. C.
384 (1821) ; Brown v. Beaver, 48 N. C. 516 (1856) ; see In re Cole's Will, 171
N. C. 74, 87 S. E. 962 (1916).
Employment of printed figures in date: As suggested in the text, discussing
the Franciscase, this situation presents a double problem. Are the holographic
numerals, by themselves, a sufficient date-and, if so, may the printed numerals
be ignored? No case has answered both questions in the affirmative. Where
the will is only dated once, and a part thereof is printed, the will has uniformly
been held invalid. Estate of Billings, 64 Cal. 427, 1 Pac. 701 (1884) ; Estate of
Plumel, 151 Cal. 77, 90 Pac. 192 (1907) ; Estate of Zollikoffer, 167 Cal. 196, 138
Pac. 995 (1914) ; Succ. of Robertson, 49 La. Ann. 868, 21 So. 586 (1897) ; In re
Noyes' Estate, sipra note 25. Several cases have .been willing to ignore a partially printed date where another date, wholly holographic, appears on the will.
Estate of Whitney, supra note 15; Jones v. Kyle, supra note 21; Estate of
Yowell, supra note 16. Contra, Estate of Francis, supra note 6. In Sneed v.
Reynolds, supra note 25, a partially printed date was ignored, the statute not
requiring dating.
Printed name of place in letterhead: As appears from the text, this has
proved to be a perplexing problem under the intent theory; under the other
theory courts have found no difficulty in disregarding the printed name as surpl.usage. See Estate of -Bernard, supra note 12; Estate of Oldham, supra
note 13; Estate of DeCaccia, supra note 14; Succ. of Robertson, 49 La. Ann.
868, 21 So. 586 (1897) ; Succ. of Heinemann, 172 La. 1057, 136 So. 51 (1931);
In re Noyes' Estate, supra note 25; In re Will of Lowrance, supra note 24.
Will written in a printed form: Only one case of this sort has been found
sustaining the will, Gooch v. Gooch, supra note 23. Contra: Estate of Rand,
supra note 10; Estate of Wolcott, stpra note 16.
Words in handwriting other than that of testator: Estate of Behrens, 130
Cal. 416, 62 Pac. 603 (1900) ; McMichael v. Bankston, supra note 11; Succ. of
Walsh, supra note 22; Baker v. Brown, supra note 25; Reeves v. Cameron, 2
Quebec Q. B. 232 (1893).
In the preceding section handwriting was the formality in issue; the question was as to the propriety of ignoring certain writing that unmistakably could
not meet the formal test. In this section different formalities are involved;
we assume that the writings under discussion all meet the handwriting test, and
ask which of them are signed (and, usually; dated) as required by the statute.
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those intended to be the will and that they satisfy the formal requirements must be shown by evidence of a certain sort.
These limitations, particularly those of the first sort, make the
legal will and the factual one not necessarily the same. This is
markedly so in the case of the attested will. From the nature of the
formalities required it results that the unity and identity of the will
is less something inherent or subjective than something arbitrarily
imposed from outside. Papers having previously no legal significance
are made into a will by the performance of a certain ceremony called
"execution". The will is the papers that are executed as such. This
means, apparently, such papers as are present and within the ambit of
the parties' intent when some one of the papers is marked (i.e.,
"signed" and "attested") as evidence of the intent thereby to give
28
life to the whole.
It is immaterial whether this is an intended result of the statute or
merely a by-product. The result in fact is to create an all-important
technique, first for simultaneously creating and integrating a will, i.e.,
for gathering the separate papers and giving them a collective significance and validity, and second for enabling a subsequent identification
and proof of the will so integrated.
The technique of the holographic will is utterly different. The
attested will may be likened to a package, the execution serving as the
wrapper; in the case of the holographic will the package has no
wrapper. The statute makes its validity something largely inherent
rather than something imposed. There are no witnesses; no collective
ceremonial act giving life to papers hitherto inert. True, the will
must be signed and, under most statutes, dated, but these acts serve
few of the integrating purposes served by the execution of an attested
will. The date quite naturally goes at the beginning of the will; many
cases allow a testator to "sign" at the beginning of the will by readily
inferring that his name at the beginning was meant to be an executing
signature. 29 Even if we assume that testator "ratifies" his will in
' This statement, of course, excludes any consideration of the technique
known as "incorporation by reference," discussed at length in the following section; it is also, obviously, very much simplified and abbreviated. It ignores such

variations as that testator need not sign in the presence of the witnesses but

may merely acknowledge a previously-made signature or even (under some

decisions) a previously-signed will, and as that under most statutes the witnesses need not attest in the presence of each other. It also perhaps states dogmatically some things which are not much more than suggested or implied by

the cases. It is believed, however, that the statement is in substance accurate.
For a detailed analysis, see Evans, s'upra note 1.

" See, e.g., Peace v. Edwards, 170 N. C. 64, 86"S. E. 807 (1915) ; Lawson
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such a case, when he is finished, a mental ratification is of no practical
importance. No one sees it; it leaves no impress on the paper. Thus
a holographic will may be duly made altho the body thereof has never
been signed or dated (in the ceremonial sense) since both the signature and date were made before there was any body to sign or date.
How far will this process be carried? If testator makes a (then)
complete holographic will in San Francisco in 1920 and fourteen years
later in New York writes an undated and unsigned memorandum containing a new testamentary provision, it may shock one's sense of fitness to say that the New York memorandum is signed and dated because testator had fourteen years before signed and dated a paper and
now meant the New York memorandum to go with it. Yet if testator
starts a will today and finishes it tomorrow we should have little
difficulty in thinking of it as one will, dated today and signed tomorrow. The difference between the cases is purely one of degree. And
neither the statute nor common sense seems to forbid testator the
privilege of putting three thousand miles and many years between
,different paragraphs of his will. If an attested will were in question,
common sense would not be involved; the statute would simply say
that the New York memorandum was not and could not be part of
the San Francisco will since it was not in existence and present when
that will was executed.
Shall we say then, that in the case of the holographic will, legal
unity is identical with lay or factual unity as hitherto defined? Shall
we say, that is, that if the papers are all holographic and there is a
dating and signing somewhere among them, it is immaterial when
or where the dating and signing was done, so long as it may be shown
or reasonably inferred that testator meant all the papers together to
constitute his will?3o
Such a test seems reasonable in at least a negative sense: it is hard
to suggest a better one, nor is this one over-technical and apt to induce
litigation. And such a test will in fact satisfy most of the cases.3 1
v. Dawson, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 361, 53 S. W. 64 (1899).

and analysis of the cases, see Mechem, supra note 17.

For further citations

' Distinguishable from the cases discussed herein are those in which several
obviously complete but more or less inconsistent wills are found and the problem is to determine which, if any, is entitled to probate as the "last" will. See,

e.g., Estate of Cook, 173 Cal. 465, 160 Pac. 553 (1916) ; Peace v. Edwards,
supra note 29; Whittle v. Roper, 149 Va. 896, 141 S. E. 753 (1928) ; cf. Estate
of Love, 75 Utah.342, 285 Pac. 299 (1930).
See Estate of Skerrett, 67 CaL 585, 8 Pac. 181 (1885) ; Estate of Merryfield, 167 Cal. 729, 141 Pac. 259 (1914) ; Estate of Johnston, 64 Cal. App. 197,
221 Pac. 382 (1923) ; Hays v. Marschall, 243 Ky. 392, 48 S. W. (2d) 540 (1932) ;
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Estate of Skerrett32 is typical. The will offered for probate consisted
of two holographic sheets found in an envelope addressed to testator's
sister. The first sheet was a copy of a deed to the sister; the original
had never been delivered. The copy contained the usual date. The
second sheet was a letter to the sister, signed but not dated. It
referred to the copy of the deed, and after expressing an intention to
provide for the sister, said: ". . . if it should please God to call me
away, you will have your own property to depend on...." There was
no evidence as to the relative time of making the two instruments.
The court said : "The instrument proposed. .. was written entirely by
the hand of the deceased, it was signed by him, and a date appears at
the commencement. Neither the copy of the deed nor the letter,
taken by itself, constitute a will; the one is not testamentary in character, the other has no date; but taking them together as the deceased left
them, forming one document, it is complete. The first part furnishes
the date, and the latter the testamentary character."
In the Skerrett case, integration appears to be deduced from the
internal coherence of the two documents and the juxtaposition in
which they had been left by testator. In Estate of Johnston,3 juxtaposition was lacking. The codicil in question was on two sheets, the
first ending abruptly with the word "over", the second beginning:
"Continuation of the codicil.... ." The.sheets were found in different
rooms but were probated together because the "circumstances" (un3 4
specified) showed that the two parts made a "consistent whole."1
A few cases nominally impose a time test. In Lagrave v. Merle 5
what appeared to be the will proper ended formally with a signature
and date. Immediately following was a brief paragraph, signed but
not dated, revoking prior wills and expressing a wish concerning
burial. It was argued that this appended paragraph was void for
lack of a date, i.e., that it was not part of the will, which clearly was
dated. This, the court conceded, quoting French authorities, would be
cf. Estate of Keith, 173 Cal. 276, 159 Pac. 705 (1916); Estate of Miller, 128

Cal. Ap, 176, 17 Pac. (2d) 181 (1932) ;Maris v. Adams, 166 S. W. 475 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1914) ; Triplett v. Triplett, 172 S. E. 162 (Va. 1934).
nSupra note 31.
'Supra note 31.
'The court said: "The second part of the codicil plainly connects with the
first part and all the circumstances of the case demonstrate that the two parts
together make a consistent whole. No more is required to satisfy the testator's
use of the expression '(over)'."
05 La. Ann. 278, 52 Am. Dec. 589 (1850). For an interesting contrast, cf.
Will of Miller, 194 N. Y. Supp. 843 (1922) (though not involving a holographic
will, raises a similar problem).
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true if the concluding paragraph were not written "immediately after
the first and on the same day that the first was written." The court
held, however, that since the various parts appeared to be "congruous
and continuous" it was bound to presume they had all been made at
the same time.
While later Louisiana cases have repeated this rule, it is difficult
to say that they have followed it. -Ithas been held that a will may
be dated five years after it was written and signed. The subsequent
dating, it is said, indicates testator's intention to "persist" in the disposition hitherto made; after that he had "which he had not before,
an instrument purporting to be his last will, and entirely written, dated
and signed in his own handwriting, which is all the law required."8 6
In Succession of Cunningham,3 7 there was a beginning, unsigned, to
which testator nearly a year later added a new paragraph, dated and
signed. The whole was held good, since where there are several dates,
it is satisfactory "so long as the signature applies to all the dates
equally." A late case38 seems to lay down the rule that so long as
there is a date at the beginning and a signature at the end, everything
spatially between will be conclusively presumed to have been written
on the named date.
The time limitation has received recognition in several California
cases. In Estate of Taylor3 9 the will was on two sheets and there
was a strong appearance that some time after original execution the
second sheet had been destroyed and a new one substituted. The court
conceded "for present purposes alone" that if this was true the will
would be void, as the first sheet was dated but not signed and the
second was signed but not dated. However, the finding of the lower
court, based on no stated evidence, that the will was "one continuous
40
instrument" and "a single document" was sustained.
Jones v. Kyle, supra note 21.
' 142.La. 701, 77 So. 506 (1918); see Succ. of Sanders, 171 La. 563, 131
So. 672 (1930).
Succ. of Guiraud, 164 La.620, 114 So.489 (1927) ;see Succ. of Dyer, 155
La.265,99 So.214 (1924) (apparently really based on the theory that the signature must be at the end).

126 Cal. 97, 58 Pac. 454 (1899).

'There are dicta of similar tenor in Estate of Hartley, 181 Cal. 469, 184

Pac. 950 (1919) and Estate of Moeller, 199 Cal. 705, 251 Pac. 311 (1926); see
Estate of Keith, supra note 31 and Estate of Finkler, 21 Pac. (2d) 681 (Cal.
App., 1933).

In Estate of Olssen, 42 Cal. App. 656, 184 Pac. 22 (1919), the

court sustains the will on the ground that the trial court "was justified in arriving at the conclusion that the instrument in question was written all at one
time, and was to be construed as a single instrument expressive of the will of

the testator." But in Estate of Henderson, 196 Cal. 623, 238 Pac. 938 (1925)
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It may be hoted that neither in Louisiana nor in California does
a will seem ever actually to have been rejected on this basis; the rule
has simply served to encourage will contests. 41 And elsewhere no
42
such limitation appears to have been thought of.
One group of cases deserves special mention: that where sheets
containing testamentary provisions are put in an envelope or other
container, and the signature or date or both appear only on the envelope. Alexander v. Johnston43 is typical. Testatrix wrote a brief
provision, dated but unsigned, and enclosed it in an envelope on which
she wrote "Julia W. Johnston Will." This was held to be a valid
will, with the envelope as a part thereof, the name on the envelope
serving as a signature. The problem is a double-edged one. Was the
envelope meant to be .part of the will? The name to be a signature?
Neither question can well be answered independently of the other; an
affirmative answer to one strongly suggests an affirmative answer to
the other. The court's decision seems to be a sensible and practical
one; on the whole, however, the authorities tend in the other direction.

44

what was obviously a postscript, which was signed but not dated, was admitted

to probate as part of the will, the court saying: "It is sufficient to know that
the deceased intended that both paragraphs were to be taken together as constituting her last will and testament." See also Estate of Clisby, 145 Cal.
407, 78 Pac. 964 (1904).
'A little moralizing on one aspect of the judicial process may be not unwarranted. It is reasonable to think that the habits of testators are much the
same everywhere. Only in California and Louisiana have cases of the sort
under discussion appeared conspicuously. Does this not justify the surmise
that the early statement by the court of last resort of a narrow and unreasonable
rule has encouraged lawyers to contest wills that elsewhere pass unchallenged?
Compare the California cases, more numerous than in any other jurisdiction, on
the question where in a holographic will testator's name must appear to qualify
as a "signature." See supra note 17.
'See Sleet v. Atwood, 186 Ky. 241, 216 S. W. 352 (1919) ; La Rue v. Lee,
63 W. Va. 388, 60 S. E. 388 (1908) ; Triplett v. Triplett, supra note 31. See
also Porter v. Ford, 82 Ky. 191 (1884) ; Gregory v. Oates, 92 Ky. 532, 18 S.
W. 231 (1892) ; cf. Sawyer v. Sawyer, 52 N. C. 134 (1859).
171 N. C. 468, 88 S. E. 785 (1916).
"In Alexander v. Johnston, the court relies strongly on the well-known case
of Fosselman v. Elder, 98 Pa. St. 159 (1881), in which an envelope on which
testatrix had written "Dear Bella, this is for you to open," and the paper inside,
were held together to constitute a valid will. Although the Pennsylvania statutes
do not recognize holographic wills, they do not in the ordinary case require attesting witnesses [see Estate of Dawson, 277 Pa. 168, 120 Atl. 828 (1923) ] so that
in a case like Fosselman v. Elder the problem is virtually the same as it would
be in the case of a holographic will. See also Estate of Harrison, 196 Pa. 576,
46 Atl. 888 (1900) ; cf. In re Jacoby's Estate, 190 Pa. St. 382. 42 Atl. 1026
(1899) ; In re Willing's Estate, 212 Pa. St. 136, 61 Atl. 812 (1905). No holographic will case has been found in accord with Alexander v. Johnston, In
Estate of Francis, supra note 6, and Estate of Poland, 137 La. 219, 68 So.
415 (1915) there is language favorable to the idea that the envelope might be
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If, as suggested, the test of integration is chiefly a subjective one,
the question of evidence would seem to be of prime importance. How
prove that the papers offered were intended together to constitute the
will? The authorities are sketchy indeed. Often the court talks of
the "coherence" of the papers or of their being "continuous" or "congruous" or the like ;45 there seems to be, however, little inclination
to state what these words mean or what the test may be. That the
papers were found together seems to be sufficient,4 6 except for the
tendency to hold the contrary in the envelope cases. In several instances evidence of testator's declarations seems to be regarded as admissible and probative, 47 altho here as elsewhere in the law of holographic wills the rules of evidence appear to be largely uncrystal48
lized.
(C) What may be incorporated?
Let us refer back to the hypothetical question asked in connection
with Estate of Francis:49 a holographic will, otherwise valid, gives the
residue equally "to the persons named in a typewritten list I have made
and left with this will." If such list is found, is proved to have been
in existence when the will was made, and is regarded as sufficiently
identified, 0 is the list "incorporated by reference"?
considered part of the will, although the will was rejected on other grounds.
In Warwick v. Warwick, 86 Va. 596, 10 S. E. 843 (1890), where testator had
written on the envelope "My Will-Abraham Warwick, Jr." the court held
that the name was clearly written as a label and not as a signature. See Estate
of Tyrell, 17 Ariz. 418, 153 Pac. 767 (1915) ; Estate of Manchester, supra note
17; Estate of Sullivan, 94 Cal. App. 674, 271 Pac. 753 (1928). In all three

cases the court seems definitely averse to treating the envelope as part of the
will. See also Mars v. Adams, supra note 31.
'See Estate of Johnston, supra note 31; Estate of Love, supra note 30;
Hays v. Marschall, supra note 31.
' See Estate of Skerrett, supra note 31 ; Estate of Merryfield, supra note 31.
" See Hays v. Marschall; Estate of Miller; Estate of Skerrett, all supra
note 31; Alexander v. Johnson, supra note 43.
The very conspicuous weakness of holographic wills in general is the inevitable difficulty of determining intent in several important regards. There is
seldom much doubt as to the genuineness of the papers propounded, i.e., as to
the fact that they are in testator's handwriting, but there is often grave doubt
as to whether he meant them to take effect after his death as a will, which papers
he meant so to take effect, whether he meant his name written in a certain place
as a signature, and so on. This difficulty doubtless explains the tendency of
courts, often inarticulate, to be extremely liberal where the admission of evidence is in question. The statutory provisions found in North Carolina and
Tennessee that the will must have been found after testator's death among his
valuable papers or have been lodged in the hands of another for safe-keeping
are presumably intended to help eliminate some of these doubts as to intent.
"Supra note 6.
OLe., assuming the case fits the ordinary requirements for incorporation
in the case of an attested will. See Evans, supra note 1, at 881-882.
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The obvious answer is no. The letter of the statute seems to
require it; it says the will must be one "wholly in the handwriting of
the testator." Can something be incorporated without making it a
part of the will? If so, whence its validity? It is not an independently valid will; it is not part of an attested will; it cannot be part
of a holographic will.51 And the apparent policy of the statute seems
to lead to the same result. For the ceremonial and non-evidentiary
values of the attested will, it substitutes values which are not ceremonial but largely evidentiary, arising, or thought to arise, from the
use of testator's handwriting. Anything not having this evidentiary
value must be disregarded; there is, under the statute, no other kind
of value it can have.
Incorporation by reference fits readily into the metaphysics of the
attested will. Any one's handwriting will do; it is not necessary that
testator and witnesses sign on every sheet. If they sign on page one,
page two, which is present, is also "executed"; the ceremony has been
performed over it, though no trace of it is visible. It is logically an
easy step to say that page three, which is not present, may be regarded
as sufficiently executed if referred to in page two, which is present.
But it is not logically an easy step to say that a non-holographic page
is "executed" by reference to it in a holographic page. On the contrary., it is logically an impossible step; it is using terms which have
no meaning in such a connection. Where one holographic page refers
to another, it makes the integration clearer; that is all that can be said
for it.52
I

Care must be taken to distinguish some superficially similar cases of iden-

tification. In Will of Thompson, 196 N. C. 271, 145 S. E. 393 (1928) testator
wrote on the back of a promissory note he owned: "I asigen thee with note over

to my wife at my death... !' This was held to be a valid holographic codicil.
The case has been cited as "supporting the doctrine of incorporation by reference in a holographic will" [Malone, Incorporation by Reference of an In-

trinsic Document into a Holographic Will (1930) 16 VA. L. REv. 571, at 583,
note 29] but it is believed that the case has nothing to do with such a process.
The note was simply described as the subject of gift; what it said did not become a -testamentary disposition in any possible sense. If a will bequeaths
"the cows in my red barn" it would hardly be said that the will "incorporated"
either the red barn or the cows. Of course the rules as to describing persons

or things are the same for a holographic will as for any other kind.
'On principle it would seem that where a holographic page refers to one
non-holographic (and not independently valid) in such a way as to show an

intent to make the latter part of the will, the result might be to invalidate the
holographic page. On neither the intent nor the surplusage theory is it clear
how the non-holographic page can be disregarded. No case, however, seems to
have carried theory to this logical extreme. See Estate of Shillaber, 74 Cal.
144, 15 Pac. 453 (1887) ; Estate of Soher, supra note 10, and discussion thereof,
infra note 64.
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It may be suggested that in the first section of this paper it was
found desirable to abandon a view theoretically inevitable (the intention theory) in favor of one theoretically untenable but practically
workable (the surplusage theory); may it be true that practical considerations suggest a similar compromise here?
Any such compromise involves substantially this: recognizing a
third way of making wills, i.e., by incorporation. Thus, it would be
said that a disposition could have testamentary effect because (a) it
was signed and attested, or (b) because it was holographic, or (c)
because it was incorporated in a valid will, even though it could never
be a part of that will.53 This, it could be said with some plausibility,
is a realistic way of explaining the process of incorporation in the
case of an attested will; it would tend to eliminate difficulties that are
awkward under the theoretical explanation, as, e.g., the difficulty of
showing that "the will" is signed at "the foot or end thereof." On
the other hand, it could be said with just as much plausibility that such
an analysis would have the extraordinary consequence of permitting
either an attested or a holographic will to incorporate a merely verbal

statement 154
Irrespective of plausibility, there seems to be one fatal practical objection to this "practical" view: it accords so very ill with the cases
discussed, supra, in section (a). If a printed figure in the date invalidates the whole will, how distinguish the case in which a will not
only tolerates but validates a whole page of printed figures? In
' Professor Costigan seems to take this view: "Integrated papers can con-

stitute a holographic will only if all the papers are holographic, but courts may
well permit a holographic paper to incorporate by reference a paper not in

testator's handwriting, and may permit a will not in his handwriting to be

brought down to the date of a holographic codicil by such codicil. If a will
may incorporate other writings and may republish and revive prior wills, it may

well be held that it is because it is a valid will, regardless of whether it is
holographic or attested, that it has all these effects." COSTIGAN , CASES ON
Wi=.s, (2d ed., 1929) 267, note. Professor Costigan; however, does not say

how integration and incorporation may be distinguished; in fact, elsewhere
(262, note) he seems to suggest that there is virtually no distinction.
r' Consider the Virginia statute [VA. CODE ANIN. (Michie, 1930) §5229]:

"No will shall be valid unless it be in writing and signed by the testator

...

and moreover, unless it be wholly in the handwriting of the testator, the signature shall be made by him or the -will acknowledged by him in the presence of at
least two competent witnesses . . . ; and such witnesses shall subscribe . ."
This statute does not any more clearly forbid verbal wills than it does written
wills not either holographic or attested. If there is any process giving testamentary significance to writings neither holographic nor attested, it is one
wholly of judicial invention and finding no sanction in the statute; as far as the

statute (and logic) goes, the same process could equally well be applied to
merely verbal dispositions.

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Estate of Bernard,5 5 where the will was rejected because of printed
words in the heading, the court said: "The printed words are incorporated in and doubtless were intended to be made a part of the
heading of the document." The court, that is, uses the word "incorporate" as descriptive of the process which, far from permitting the
inclusion of printed words, on the contrary renders the rest of the will
void because of the mere attempt. 56 Aside from the inconsistency in
the use of the word, how can we handle a process which has two
diametrically opposed effects. If we call x the process by which the
attempt to use ("incorporate") a printed word or figure invalidates
the whole will, and y that by which the will may validate ("incorporate") printed words or figures, how know whether to use x or y?
Shall we say that x applies to printed matter on the same sheet, and y
to printed matter on another sheet? But why not extend y to printed
matter on the other side of the same sheet? 57 And then how
refuse to extend it to printed matter in another paragraph?
The difficulty may be illustrated by the Virginia case of Gibson
'Supra note 12.
'Attention may also be.called to the new provision of the California Code
(supra note 18) providing that printed matter, &c., shall not be considered part
of the will (so as to invalidate it) unless "incorporated in the provisions,"
and so on. Quaere, as to whether this was inadvertent or was intended to prevent further "incorporation by reference."
In the leading case of Estate of Plumel, supra note 26, there was a will
on one side of a sheet of paper, and a brief codicil (at least it was so denominated by testator although it really appeared to be an independent conditional
will) on the other. Both were dated and signed, and both were holograpbic
except that two of the figures in the dating of the will were printed. The
court held that the will was invalid because of the printed figures but that it
was incorporated -by the valid codicil I The effect of the decision is that printed
figures can be incorporated if they are on the other side of the sheet; not if
they are on the same side. It may be suggested that the desired result could
have been achieved, without going beyond the bounds of what is reasonable, by
holding that the provisions on both sides together constituted the will; the first
attempt at dating could then plausibly be ignored as surplusage.
128 Grat. 44 (Va. 1877). Probate of the whole was refused. The members
of the court disagreed and the opinion is not wholly clear; all agreed however,
that the second -paragraph could not be "taken in connection with" the first "as
that is not in the hand-writing of decedent." In a later case, Gooch v. Gooch,
upra note 23, the same court held that a revoked will, not wholly in the hand
of testator, could be "revived" by a holographic codicil; the Gibson case was not
mentioned. A very late Virginia case, Triplett v. Triplett, supra note 31,
illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing between incorporation and integration.
New provisions subsequently interlined in the first will were held valid by "reexecution"; other new provisions on a separate page were held void as not
"incorporated." The application of the simple test of integration suggested
herein (supra) would have rendered the case much simpler and apparently
led to a result more in accord with the intention of the testator. Maris v.
Adams, supra note 31, is another case illustrating the same point; the several
opinions, confused and inconclusive, show the difficulties which the court was
led into by the attempt to apply the doctrine of incorporation.
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v. Gibson. 8 At the top of a sheet was written a brief (purported)
will, not in testator's handwriting, signed but not attested. Immediately below was written in testator's handwriting, dated and signed:
"As Margaret [a legatee in the unattested will] is dead,
I give her share to my niece, L. L. Gibson."
Cases could easily be cited for treating this as a case for integration,
i.e., for treating the two provisions as together constituting a will. 59
As such, it would probably fail. But authorities could as easily be
cited for treating it as a case for incorporation, i.e., for treating the
second provision as an independent testamentary document incorporating the first.60 And then, under the "practical" view, it would
all be valid.
The envelope cases furnish another illustration. Those discussed
herein have chiefly treated the problem as one of integration, but
several English decisions6 1 (involving, of course, attested wills) seem
inclined to consider the envelope as incorporating the enclosure. These
alternative theories offer no difficulties in the case of attested wills
since they are not necessarily inconsistent; in the holographic cases,
the difficulty is acute and seems to indicate that there is a fundamental
error in attempting to apply the technique of incorporation to holographic wills at all.
Text writers disagree on the point ;62 the cases likewise are split.63
Two things are noteworthy about the cases holding that there may be
See, e.g., Succ. of Cunningham, srupra note 37; Estate of Henderson, supra
note 40.
'See, e.g., Beall v. Cunningham, 3 B. Mon. 393 (Ky. 1843); Hatcher v.
Hatcher, 80 Va. 169 (1885).
1 See In re Goods of Almosnino, 1 Swa. & Tr. 508 (1859) ; cf. In re Nicholls
[1921] 2 Ch. 11.
' Professor Costigan supports the view that there can be incorporation (see
the excerpt quoted, supra note 53). Mr. T. H. Malone has written an article
strongly urging the same view (see supra note 51). It is not clear, however, on
what his, view is based. Dean Evans seems to intimate to the contrary (see
supra note 1 at 882) ("California, curiously enough, has allowed an incorporation of an instrument not entirely holographic into a subsequent testamentary
paper written on the reverse side of the page. The incorporating paper contained a date, as did the incorporated paper, but the latter date was not in the
testator's hand. It is difficult to see how the latter may be omitted as surplusage, having been intended as a part of the will and not being inadvertent.
If this is treated as surplusage might other matters not in the testator's hand
likewise be treated as surplusage?")
3Allowing incorporation: Estate of Plumel, supra note 26; Gooch v. Gooch,
.&upra note 23; Rogers v. Agricola, 176 Ark. 287, 3 S. W. (2d) 26 (1928).
Contra: Gibson v. Gibson, supra note 58; Sharp v. Wallace, 83 Ky. 584 (1886) ;
Hewes v. Hewes, 110 Miss. 826, 71 So. 4 (1916). Doubtful are Mars v. Adams,
supra note 31; Barney v. Hayes, 11 Mont. 99, 571, 27 Pac. 384, 29 Pac. 282

(1892).

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
incorporation.

First, none of them discusses the real issue.0 4 This

seems to indicate either that the court did not see the problem at all
or that it was unwilling to try to justify its decision. Second, all of
them are cases in which the document to be incorporated was an
earlier complete will, now or ab initio invalid. This has a double im-

portance. It is the case which looks least like integration. 0 And it
is possible that to some extent there has developed an independent
doctrine, based in part on statutes, that a valid codicil may "republish"
an earlier invalid will.68
The cases which refuse to allow incorporation are explicit. Sharp

v. Wallace07 is the best known.

On facts not unlike those in the

Gibson case, supra, the court said: ". . . where the preceding instrument has never been completed, it and the codicil, which has the

effect to give it validity that it never before had, must be taken together and make but one will, not merely for the purpose of construction but as to their execution; and it seems to us that such must be
the logical and necessary result of imparting to the codicil the legal
effect of making valid as a will an instrument having no efficacy
without."
This, it is submitted, is the sound result; sound from the standpoint of analysis as well as from the standpoint of providing a tolerable and workable rule.
,Thqre is a rather full discussion of the matter in Estate of Soher, supra
note 10. There testator wrote a brief holographic codicil at the foot of his
duly attested will, which was not in his handwriting. It was urged that the
whole was void on the ground that the will became a part of the codicil. The
court admitted the argument was "plausible" but said that "as a matter of
physical fact" the two documents were not one. "The law for some purposesmainly of construction-regards one as a part of the other. But this fiction
ought not to be extended to absurd or unjust consequences." See Estate of
Atkinson, 110 Cal. App. 499, 294 Pac. 425 (1930). Under the surplusage
theory, this problem seems readily soluble; since the will is independently valid,
it may be ignored as no necessary part of the holographic codicil.
As distinguished, e.g., from the case where the will attempts to incorporate
a list, and the process, whatever it be called, is obviously one of creating a
testamentary disposition out of two parts, each of which is palpably incomplete
by itself.
'While it is logically difficult to see how the "republication" by codicil of a
will either never before valid or once valid and now revoked can operate except
as a form of integration or incorporation by reference, there seems to be a
tendency on the part of courts to treat this as an independent doctrine. Vidt
the New York rule that a will once valid but revoked by operation of law may
be republished, although incorporation in general is not recognized. See In re
Emmons' Will, 96 N. Y. Supp. 506 (1906). And of course the logical difficulty
is eliminated where-there is an express statute. In a few states there are statutes (see Bordwell, supra note 2, at 308-310) of a somewhat ambiguous nature, providing for the "republication" of a will or the "revival" of a revoked
will, by codicil. For the bearing of these statutes, see Estate of Plumel, supra
note 26; Gooch v. Gooch, mipra note 23; Barney v. Hays, supra note 63.
' Supra note 63.

